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1. Introduction 
In the business world, it is common to see a firm acquiring another firm but later divesting 
it, or a firm divesting a division but later reacquiring it. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) find that 
33% of acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s were later divested. Porter (1987) finds that more 
than half of the acquisitions in new industries were subsequently divested and a startling 74% of 
the unrelated acquisitions were later divested. He observed that “even a highly respected com-
pany like General Electric divested a very high percentage of its acquisitions.” Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) also find that, for a sample of large acquisitions during 1971-1982, the acquir-
ers divested almost 44% of the acquired divisions by the end of 1989. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that firms that merge and then divest often perform well in the interim period, indicating 
that divestitures are not failures of the past (Allen et al., 1995).  
Most of the literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) treats M&As and divestitures as 
separate strategic decisions (see survey papers by Singh (1993), Johnson (1996), Brauer (2006), 
Moschieri and Mair (2008), and Hitt et al. (2009)). The literature has discussed many possible 
reasons for M&As and divestitures, including market power, scale economies, risk aversion, 
operational synergies, and legal and tax benefits. However, many of these reasons arguably fail 
to explain M&As and divestitures, especially since most of the acquired divisions are later di-
vested. Given that a divested business unit is often one that was acquired in the past, it is con-
ceivable that when deciding whether or not to acquire a business unit, firms take into account 
the possibility of divesting that unit in the future. Conversely, a planned divestiture in the future 
is likely to be conditional on what the firm decides to do today. Hence, M&As and divestitures 
are naturally tied across time in firms’ considerations.  
There are relatively few studies focusing on the tied M&As and divestitures which are actu-
ally causes and consequences of each other. Weston (1989) lists 14 reasons for M&As and divest-
itures. He concludes that “the data on divestiture/acquisition rates portray a healthy dynamic 
interplay between the strategic planning of U.S. companies and continually shifting market 
forces”. A popular view in the literature is that “acquirers often buy other firms only to sell them 
later”. Porter (1987) finds that most divestitures are successful acquisitions of the past. Prior 
literature further points out that the option of divesting an acquired division is what makes the 
value of an acquisition positive (Porter, 1987; Weston, 1989; Aron, 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach, 
1992; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005; Fulghieri and Hodrick, 2006) and that the reacquisition of a 
divested division is also efficient (Aron, 1991). Fluck and Lynch (1999) theorize that an acquisi-
tion occurs when the acquiree needs funding (e.g. a start-up or distressed firm) and this ac-
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quiree is later divested once its performance has improved sufficiently to allow it to be 
standalone again. However, by examining the 1960s conglomerate wave, Hubbard and Pahlia 
(1999) find that acquirers neither appear to have higher levels of free cash flows than non-
acquirers nor are they punished by the stock market. We argue that two firms may choose to 
integrate today simply because they plan to be integrated or to separate in the future or because 
they were integrated or separated in the past. Our theory is consistent with both Fluck and 
Lynch’s (1999) theory and Hubbard and Pahlia’s (1999) empirical finding. 
 We develop a two-period model with two firms, a downstream firm (DF) and an upstream 
firm (UF). In this setting, we deal with related M&As and divestitures. Our model is built on the 
view that mergers and divestitures are corporate strategies based on internal characteristics and 
capabilities and external market conditions. When the firms decide to integrate or separate in 
the first period, they will have considered whether to be integrated or separated in the second 
period. Similarly, when the firms plan to integrate or separate in the second period, their plan is 
affected by what they do now. Without the influence of the decision in one period, the decision 
in the other period (called a static solution) can be very different. We emphasize the influence of 
past and expected future decisions. When considering integration or separation now, whether 
they are already integrated or separated will obviously have a major influence. When a decision 
takes into account another decision in the future, we call it a forward-looking decision. We also 
consider backward-looking mergers and divestitures, where a backward-looking decision takes 
into account a decision made in the past. We identify forward-looking and backward-looking 
behavior by comparing a two-period dynamic solution with a one-period static solution. If we 
compare a two-period solution with a one-period solution in the first period, we can identify the 
forward-looking effect in the two-period solution. If we compare a two-period solution with a 
one-period solution in the second period, we can identify the backward-looking effect in the 
two-period solution. For example, a backward-looking merger is a merger that is conditional on 
the fact that the two firms were merged or separated in the past. We provide a unified model in 
which both mergers and divestitures are decisions and both decisions can be forward or back-
ward looking. 
Our model has a number of interesting features. First, it is safer to be part of a firm than to 
be an independent firm in the competitive market. An upstream division in a firm has the ad-
vantage that there is always a demand for its product. An independent upstream firm faces the 
risk of not being able to find a buyer for its product. Second, asset specificity plays a role when a 
firm’s status changes from separated to integrated or vice versa. An upstream division in an 
integrated firm may have to produce a specific intermediate product for the firm. But when it is 
an independent firm in the market, it may have to produce a general product for the market. 
This means that the upstream firm may incur adjustment cost when it switches from being an 
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integrated division to being an independent firm, and vice versa. Due to asset specificity, there is 
an adjustment cost for an organizational change. The adjustment cost is a force working against 
a reversal of an earlier decision. Hence, the UF changes its status only if the benefit of doing so 
is large enough. For more on such adjustment cost in the literature, see theoretical analysis in 
Riordan and Williamson (1985) and empirical evidence in Chang and Singh (1999). The use of 
adjustment cost in our model is consistent with those studies in the literature that emphasize 
organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Riordan, 1990; Amburgey et al. 1993; 
Shimizu and Hitt, 2005). Third, market fluctuation is a factor in organizational decisions. Our 
model takes into account the fact that the market may expand or contract over time. The firms 
may decide to change their organizational structure in response to market changes. Fourth, our 
model takes into account synergy when the two firms integrate. Synergy under integration is 
captured by the condition that the marginal output under integration is larger than that under 
separation. Synergy in our model is endogenous in the sense that, when the two firms merge, 
their contractual relationship changes accordingly, which affects incentives and in turn the gain 
from synergy. Negative synergy is also allowed. In fact, even when negative synergy and adjust-
ment cost exist, the two firms may choose to integrate if other conditions are ripe for integra-
tion. Fifth, incentives are governed by contracts. A contract is a revenue-sharing arrangement 
offered by a firm’s owners to its manager. We identify the optimal contracts for several common 
cases. Incentive encourages “effort”, which includes work attitude, work intensity, time spent, 
and financial investment. The solution from our model offers an optimal linear contract—a 
contract that is at least as good as any nonlinear contract. In the literature, most so-called opti-
mal linear contracts are not optimal since they are strictly inferior to many nonlinear contracts. 
Sixth, a firm’s internal contractual arrangement is conditional on its organizational structure. 
This means that, if the two firms change their organizational structure, their internal contractual 
relationship will adjust accordingly. Seventh, managers in independent firms may have better 
incentives than divisional managers. A feature specific to our model is that, the UF’s incentive is 
better under separation, since the contract under separation is based on the UF’s output directly 
while the contract under integration is related to the UF’s output indirectly through the DF’s 
revenue. Eighth, the mood in the marketplace may affect firms’ decisions. We use a discount 
factor of time preferences to take into account the market mood. The firms may decide to inte-
grate early if they feel optimistic now, and they may decide to separate later if they feel pessimis-
tic now. This discount factor may also be due to risk aversion to uncertainty in the marketplace. 
Ninth, our model emphasizes forward expectations and backward history dependence in firms’ 
decisions. Tenth, the history is exogenous in the “dependence on history” in the literature. How-
ever, it is endogenous in our “dependence on the past”. The current decision is a planned deci-
sion in the past when the past decision was made, and the past decision was made conditional 
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on the current decision. In this sense, we say that the past is endogenous to the current decision. 
Dependence on endogenous history is fundamentally different from dependence on exogenous 
history. For example, market fluctuations have no effect on our forward-looking solutions. The 
explanation is that, since a planned decision has already taken into account market fluctuations 
in the future, it need not do so again when the time comes to carrying out that decision. Finally, 
our model is based on the view that diversification/integration is value enhancing. Some papers 
in the literature argue that diversification/integration is value destroying (see Fama (1980), 
Amihud and Lev (1981), Hart (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jensen (1986), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Stulz (1990)). We do not subscribe to the view in 
the literature that “divestitures represent failures”. We believe that firms integrate or separate 
only if doing so improves their overall profitability. 
Our solution is consistent with many empirical findings, and it can explain some seemingly 
puzzling phenomena. First, our solution includes the case (case IS) in which a firm acquires 
another for the purpose of selling it later at a higher value. This is consistent with many studies 
in prior literature, including Kaplan and Weisbach’s (1992) observation that on average targets 
are divested at 143% of their preacquisition market value, John and Ofek’s (1995) empirical 
finding that a typical divested division performs as well as the industry at the time of divestiture, 
and Fluck and Lynch’s (1999) theoretical prediction that mergers are followed by good perfor-
mance and divestitures. Second, our solution is consistent with the evidence that diversified 
firms are less valuable than focused firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Servaes, 1996). In our solution, two firms may choose to integrate or separate due to past and 
planned decisions, and not because of current value only. M&As and divestitures may be value 
enhancing if we take into account their forward- and backward-looking behavior, but they may 
be value destroying if we look at their current value only. Third, firms are often observed to 
divest poorly performing divisions (Hayward and Shimizu, 2006). In our solution, the DF may 
acquire the UF conditional on a plan to divest it when the latter becomes unprofitable due to 
prevailing market conditions. In this case, the acquirer is shown to have acquired a poorly per-
forming firm ex post. This is due to the forward-looking behavior, and not because of entrench-
ment, mistakes, etc. Fourth, our solution is consistent with two seemingly contradictory empiri-
cal findings: (1) mergers increase the combined value of the acquirer and the target and (2) 
diversified firms are less valuable than more focused standalone entities. Claim (1) is based on 
the stock market reactions when a merger is announced, and hence on ex ante evaluations. 
Claim (2) is based on ex post results. We allow a situation in which a firm divests a division 
because of a past decision or an expected future decision, and not because of the division’s cur-
rent performance. Integration may be value enhancing ex ante by being forward looking, but it 
may be value reducing ex post by being backward looking. This can happen, for example, if 
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integration offers security to acquirees. Also, as will be shown in Proposition 3, an M&A is likely 
to happen if substantial synergy exists and firms feel very optimistic now. In these two exam-
ples, the acquisition improves the overall value ex ante, but it may reduce the overall value ex 
post. 
Our main findings are: Forward- and backward-looking organizational decisions are sub-
stantially different from static ones. The influence of the past is stronger if the market is con-
tracting, if the adjustment cost is larger, or if the time preference for the future is weaker. On the 
other hand, the influence of the future is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger, if the prefer-
ence for the future is stronger, or if the chance of making deals in the market is lower. Further, 
in the case where two firms do decide to integrate for a short term, the tendency for late (early) 
integration over early (late) integration is stronger if the marginal output under integration is 
substantially less than that under separation, if the chance of making deals in the market is 
higher, or if the market is expanding sufficiently quickly.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the solution. 
There are four cases: the two firms separate in the first period but reintegrate in the second 
period, the two firms integrate in the first period but separate in the second period, the two 
firms integrate in the first period and remain integrated in the second period, and the two firms 
separate in the first period and remain separated in the second period. Section 4 presents and 
analyzes a parametric solution. Section 5 concludes the paper. Finally, the appendix provides 
proofs of the results in Section 3 and justifies our choice of the parametric functions in Section 4.  
2. The Model 
Consider a two-period model with two firms, a downstream firm (DF) and an upstream firm 
(UF). If the two firms are separate, the DF buys input 𝑥 from the market or the UF; if the two 
firms are integrated, the DF is the sole user of the UF’s output 𝑥 and the UF is the DF’s sole 
supplier.   
In practice, the DF is typically the parent firm. Hence, the DF is the principal and the UF is 
the agent in our model. This means that if the two firms are integrated, the DF designs and 
offers a profit-sharing contract to the UF, and the UF decides whether to take it or leave it. If the 
two firms are separate, with probability 𝜃, the UF receives a purchasing contract from the DF for 
its output; with probability 1 − 𝜃, the UF receives no contract. The DF can always buy the same 
input from other upstream firms.  
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The two firms invest into their own production separately. The UF’s investment is denoted 
by 𝑎, and the DF’s investment is denoted by 𝑏. We call them efforts, which includes work atti-
tude, work intensity, time spent, and financial investment. The costs of efforts for the UF and 
DF are respectively 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) and 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). As is typical in agency problems, these costs are private, 
meaning that each party pays for its own cost (not covered in a contract).  
 Let 𝜋𝑡(𝑥, 𝑏) be the DF’s profit function in period 𝑡. This profit is the pre-contractual profit, 
which includes part of the production costs, but not the cost of 𝑥 and 𝑏. The appendix offers a 
more detailed explanation of the pre-contractual profit. The market may expand or contract, 
which is an important factor in organizational decisions. The dependence of the profit on time 
allows us to incorporate market fluctuations. The firms may decide to change their organiza-
tional relationship in response to the changing market.  
Let 𝑥𝑠(𝑎) be the UF’s output function under status 𝑠, where the status can be either 𝑠 = 𝐼 for 
“integration” or 𝑠 = 𝑆 for “separation”. The dependence of the UF’s output on the status allows 
us to take into account synergy when the two firms integrate. Synergy exists if the UF’s marginal 
output is increased after it is acquired by the DF. Negative synergy is also allowed. In fact, even 
when negative synergy and adjustment cost exist, the two firms may choose to integrate if other 
conditions strongly favor integration.1  
We incorporate asset specificity in our model. If the two firms are integrated, the UF pro-
duces a relationship-specific product for the integrated firm; if not, it produces a general prod-
uct for the market. Suppose there is adjustment cost 𝑐𝐴(𝑥, 𝑏) when the UF switches from produc-
ing a general product to a specific product or vice versa. The UF pays this cost out of its own 
pocket. This cost is dependent on its production capacity and the product’s technological level. 
We use the UF’s first-period output 𝑥 to represent the production capacity and the DF’s first-
period investment 𝑏 to represent the technological level. Imagine that the UF hires someone to 
adjust machines and production procedures when it switches from producing a specific product 
to a general product or vice versa. We expect the marginal cost of this activity to be diminishing. 
Hence, we can assume 𝑐𝐴(𝑥, 𝑏) to be concave. This adjustment cost discourages the UF from 
changing its status and hence is a force working against a reversal of an earlier decision.  
We also incorporate market risk in our model. A type of market risk is the risk of failing to 
make a deal when the UF becomes an independent firm in a competitive market. Given contrac-
tual payment 𝑠(𝑥), if the UF receives a purchasing contract, its payoff under separation is  
𝑢(?̃?) = 𝜃𝑠(𝑥), 
                                                        
1 We can easily extend our model to allow profit 𝜋𝑡 and output 𝑥𝑡 in each period to be random. 
This extension is shown in the Appendix. All our results remain the same after this extension. 
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where 𝜃 is the probability of having a deal. When there is no deal, there is no payoff. We assume 
that the DF can always find a supplier of 𝑥, but the UF may not be able to find a buyer for its 
product. Although 𝜃 is given a specific meaning in our model, we can think of 𝜃 as representing 
market risks when the UF is independent in the market.2 Hence, it is safer to be part of a firm 
than to be independent in the competitive market. An upstream division in an integrated firm 
has the advantage that there is always a demand for its product. An independent UF faces the 
risk of not being able to find a buyer.  
There is a discount factor 𝛿 on the payoff of the second period. This 𝛿 represents the prefer-
ence for the future. We may interpret it as representing the market mood. The mood in the 
marketplace may affect firms’ decisions. The firms may decide to integrate early if they feel 
optimistic now, and they may decide to separate later if they feel pessimistic now. We may also 
interpret this discount factor as representing risk aversion to uncertainty in the market. 
Investments/efforts 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not verifiable, but profit and output 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑥𝑠 are verifiable 
ex post. Incentives for investments are provided by contracts. A contract is a profit- or output-
sharing rule. The contract 𝑠(𝑥𝑠) for the UF under separation is the payment to the UF based on 
the UF’s output, while the contract 𝑠(𝜋𝑡) for the UF under integration is the payment to the UF 
based on the DF’s profit.3  
When the firms decide to integrate or separate in the first period, they will think/decide 
ahead about whether they want to be integrated or separated in the second period. Similarly, 
when the firms decide to integrate or separate in the second period, their decision is affected by 
what they do now. Such forward- and backward-looking behavior lead to four possibilities:  
 Case SI: The two firms are separated in the first period, but integrated in the second period.  
 Case IS: The two firms are integrated in the first period, but separated in the second period.  
 Case II: The two firms are integrated in both periods. 
 Case SS: The two firms are separated in both periods. 
                                                        
2 We can easily extend our model to allow 𝜃 and 𝑥𝑠(𝑎) to be dependent on time 𝑡 (the period). 
Allowing 𝜃 and 𝑥𝑠(𝑎) to be time-dependent captures the influence of market conditions on them. 
However, it turns out that these extensions are unnecessary since all our results remain the 
same. 
3 A more general contract of the form 𝑠(𝜋𝑡 , 𝑥) under integration will not change the solution at 
all. 
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There are a few underlying tradeoffs between integration and separation in our model. First, 
the UF’s incentive is better under separation, but it faces a risk of having no business under 
separation. On the one hand, when the UF is independent, its income is directly related to its 
output; this is not so when the UF is acquired by the DF. Hence, the UF has better incentives 
when it is independent. On the other hand, integration guarantees demand, but there is no 
guarantee of demand under separation. Second, the adjustment cost deters organizational 
changes, but market risks and fluctuations encourage organizational changes. For example, a 
quickly expanding market may induce firms to emphasize incentives so that separation becomes 
a more preferable option.  
3. The Four Cases 
In this section, we set up the optimization problem for each of the four cases and find its so-
lution. 
3.1. Case SI 
In this case, the two firms are separated in the first period but integrated in the second pe-
riod. In the second period, the UF receives a contract 𝑠2(𝜋). This contract is based on the inte-
grated firm’s profit 𝜋 since the two firms are integrated at that time. The UF’s ex post problem in 
the second period is 
𝑈2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) ≡ max
𝑎
 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1], 
where the UF has to pay the adjustment cost for switching from being an independent firm to 
being an integrated firm. The adjustment cost 𝑐𝐴 is dependent on the past (first-period) produc-
tion capacity 𝑥(𝑎1) and investment 𝑏1. Here, “ex post” is after a contract is accepted, while “ex 
ante” is before a contract is accepted. The first-order condition (FOC) is 
𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem in the second period is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
 𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 
Then, the DF’s ex ante problem in the second period is 
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𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) ≡ max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
                             s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)
                                     𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                                     𝐼𝑅:    𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 (1) 
Here, 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑏) is actually 𝜋2(𝑥𝐼 , 𝑏2) and 𝑥(𝑎) is actually 𝑥𝐼(𝑎2), indicating second-period variables 
under integration. For convenience, we do not specify the subscripts. This applies to all cases. 
When necessary, the subscripts will be specified. As shown in the Appendix, problem (1) can be 
solved in two steps. First, we solve the following problem for optimal efforts (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗) without 
referring to 𝑠2: 
 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]






′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (2) 




′ [𝑥(𝑎∗), 𝑏∗]𝑥′(𝑎∗) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎∗)
𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎
∗), 𝑏∗]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎
∗) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 (3) 
We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠2(𝜋) = 𝛼2𝜋 + 𝛽2, with two constants 𝛼2 and 𝛽2, to 
satisfy (3).  
In the first period, the two firms are separated. With probability 𝜃, the DF offers a contract 
𝑠1(𝑥) to the UF in the first period based on the UF’s output 𝑥; with probability 1 − 𝜃, the UF 
cannot find a buyer for its product in the first period. Given this contract, the UF’s ex post prob-
lem in the first period is 
𝑈1 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝛿𝜃𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏), 
where 𝜃 is applied to the second-period payoff since the DF picks the UF with probability 𝜃 to 
integrate; with probability 1 − 𝜃, the UF is not integrated with the DF in the second period. The 
FOC of the above problem is 
𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) + 𝛿𝜃𝑈2,𝑎
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem in the first period is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 





 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
                s.t.     𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) + 𝛿𝜃𝑈2,𝑎
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                          𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                          𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] + 𝛿𝜃𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (4) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (4) can be solved in two steps. First, we solve the following 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
             s.t.   𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (5) 
Second, given (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗), we find an 𝑠1 that satisfies 
 
𝜃𝑠1






We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠1(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1, with two constants 𝛼1 and 𝛽1, to 
satisfy (6). 
3.2. Case IS 
In this case, the two firms are integrated in the first period but separated in the second pe-
riod. In the second period, with probability 𝜃, the UF receives a contract 𝑠2(𝑥). The UF has to 
pay the adjustment cost for switching from being an integrated firm to being an independent 
firm. The UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) ≡ max
𝑎
 𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]. 
Its FOC is 
𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 
Then, the DF’s ex ante problem is 
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𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) ≡ max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
                             s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                                     𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                                     𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 (7) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (7) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 
problem for optimal efforts (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗) without referring to 𝑠2: 
 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝜃
−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝜃
−1𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]
                           s.t.  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (8) 
Then, given (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗) and (𝑎1, 𝑏1), we find an 𝑠2 that satisfies 
 
𝜃𝑠2




∗) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 (9) 
We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠2(𝑥) = 𝛼2𝑥 + 𝛽2, with two constants 𝛼2 and 𝛽2, to 
satisfy (9).  
In the first period, the two firms are integrated. The DF offers a contract 𝑠1(𝜋) based on its 
profit 𝜋 to the UF. Given this contract, the UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈1 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝛿𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) + 𝛿𝑈2,𝑎
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 




𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
                s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) + 𝛿𝑈2,𝑎
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                         𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                         𝐼𝑅:    𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} + 𝛿𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏) ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (10) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (10) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 





 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
              s.t.  𝜋𝑏






′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (11) 




′ [𝑥(𝑎∗), 𝑏∗]𝑥′(𝑎∗) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎∗),
𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎
∗), 𝑏∗]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎
∗).
 (12) 
We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠1(𝜋) = 𝛼1𝜋 + 𝛽1, with two constants 𝛼1 and 𝛽1, to 
satisfy (12).  
3.3. Case II 
In this case, the two firms are integrated in both periods. In the second period, the DF offers 
a contract 𝑠2(𝜋) to the UF. Given this contract, the UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈2 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎). 
Its FOC is 
𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
 𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 




𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
               s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)
                        𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                        𝐼𝑅:    𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (13) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (13) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
            s.t.   𝜋𝑏













′ [𝑥(𝑎∗), 𝑏∗]𝑥′(𝑎∗) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎∗),
 𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎
∗), 𝑏∗]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎
∗).
 (15) 
We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠2(𝜋) = 𝛼2𝜋 + 𝛽2, with two constants 𝛼2 and 𝛽2, to 
satisfy (15).  
In the first period, the two firms are integrated. The DF offers a contract 𝑠1(𝜋) to the UF. 
Given this contract, the UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈1 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝛿𝑈2. 
Its FOC is 
𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2. 
Its FOC is 
𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 




𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2
                s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                         𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                         𝐼𝑅:    𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} + 𝛿𝑈2 ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (16) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (16) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2
            s.t.   𝜋𝑏












′ [𝑥(𝑎∗), 𝑏∗]𝑥′(𝑎∗) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎∗),
𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎
∗), 𝑏∗]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎
∗).
 (18) 
We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠1(𝜋) = 𝛼1𝜋 + 𝛽1, with two constants 𝛼1 and 𝛽1, to 
satisfy (18).  
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3.4. Case SS 
In this case, the two firms are separate in both periods. In the second period, with probabil-
ity 𝜃, the UF receives contract 𝑠2(𝑥).  The UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈2 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎). 
Its FOC is 
𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). 
Its FOC is 
 𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 




𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
              s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                       𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                       𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (19) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (19) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
            s.t.   𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (20) 
Then, given (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗), we find an 𝑠2 that satisfies 
 
𝜃𝑠2






We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠2(𝑥) = 𝛼2𝑥 + 𝛽2, with two constants 𝛼2 and 𝛽2, to 
satisfy (21).  
In the first period, the two firms are also separate. With probability 𝜃, the UF receives con-
tract 𝑠1(𝑥).  The UF’s ex post problem is 
𝑈1 ≡ max
𝑎
 𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝛿𝑈2. 
Its FOC is 
𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎). 
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The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2. 
Its FOC is 
𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 




𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2
                 s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                          𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                          𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] + 𝛿𝑈2 ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 (22) 
As shown in the Appendix, problem (22) can be solved in two steps. We first solve the following 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2
              s.t.   𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (23) 
Then, given (𝑎∗, 𝑏∗), we find an 𝑠1 that satisfies 
 
𝜃𝑠1






We can find a linear contract of the form 𝑠1(𝑥) = 𝛼1𝑥 + 𝛽1, with two constants 𝛼1 and 𝛽1, to 
satisfy (24).  
4. Analysis 
According to (A2) and (A3), we choose the following functional forms for 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑥𝑠: 
𝜋𝑡(𝑥, 𝑏) = 𝐴𝑡𝑓(𝑥, 𝑏),         𝑥𝑠(𝑎) = 𝐵𝑠𝑔(𝑎), 
where 𝐴𝑡 > 0 and 𝐵𝑠 > 0 are some constants and 𝑓 and 𝑔 are some functions. More specifically, 
let 
 𝜋𝑡(𝑥, 𝑏) = 𝐴𝑡√𝑥𝑏,     𝑥𝑠(𝑎) = 𝐵𝑠𝑎,     𝑐𝐷(𝑏) = 𝑏
2,     𝑐𝑈(𝑎) = 𝑎
2,     𝑐𝐴(𝑥, 𝑏) = 𝜌𝐴1√𝑥𝑏 , (25) 
where 𝑡 is the period and 𝑠 is the status, 𝑡 = 1,2 and 𝑠 = 𝑆, 𝐼. Here, the adjustment cost is con-
cave. This set of parametric functions are rich enough to capture some popular factors involving 
mergers and divestitures. For example, synergy under integration is captured by the condition 
that the marginal output under integration is larger than that under separation, i.e., 𝐵𝐼 > 𝐵𝑆.  
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Since the UF has no surplus, these payoffs are also the joint payoffs (social welfare) of the two 
firms. 
We will also consider one-period models. For the one-period model in the first period, we 
set 𝛿 = 0 in the above solutions and obtain payoffs 𝑉1𝑆 and 𝑉1𝐼 for separation and integration, 
respectively. These are the payoffs of separation and integration in the first period when there is 
no second period. Similarly, for the one-period model in the second period, we obtain payoffs 

















2𝐵𝐼 . (27) 
We identify forward-looking and backward-looking behavior by comparing a two-period dynam-
ic solution with a one-period static solution. By comparing a two-period solution with a one-
period solution in the first period, we can identify the forward-looking effect in the two-period 
solution. By comparing a two-period solution with a one-period solution in the second period, 
we can identify the backward-looking effect in the two-period solution. 
4.1. Influence of Past Decisions 
Given the decisions in the first period, we now analyze the decisions in the second period. In 
the second period, the two firms consider integrating or separating conditional on the decision 
made in the first period. That is, the firms’ organizational decisions in the second period are 
backward looking. We consider two pairs of comparison: 
𝑉𝑆𝐼  vs.  𝑉𝑆𝑆,    𝑉𝐼𝐼  vs.  𝑉𝐼𝑆. 
In the first pair, the first-period status is separation; in the second pair, the first-period status is 
integration. 
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Given First-Period Separation: Cases SI vs. SS 
Given that the two firms are separate in the first period, they consider integrating or staying 
















We can draw five conclusions from (28). First, since (28) is more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is larger, 
given separation in the first period, the tendency for integration in the second period is stronger 
if the UF’s marginal output under integration is substantially larger than that under separation. 
Second, since (28) is more likely to hold if 𝜃 is smaller, given separation in the first period, the 
tendency for integration is stronger in the second period if the chance of making deals in the 
market is lower. Third, since (28) is more likely to hold if 𝜌 is smaller, the tendency for a change 
of status is stronger in the second period if the adjustment cost is smaller. In this case, since the 
two firms are separated in the first period, it is less costly to integrate in the second period if the 
adjustment cost is smaller. Fourth, since (28) is more likely to hold if 𝐴2/𝐴1 is larger, given 
separation in the first period, the tendency for integration is stronger in the second period if the 
market is expanding. The explanation is that, with an expanding market, the agency problem in 
an integrated firm is lessened. Fifth, since the right-hand side of (28) is decreasing in 𝛿, given 
separation in the first period, the tendency for integration is stronger in the second period if the 
preference for the future is stronger (i.e., the discount factor is larger). That is, when the future 
is viewed more importantly, the fact that the two firms are separated in the first period is less of 
a factor for integration in the second period.  
In contrast, if the first period does not exist (or not in consideration), the payoffs are as de-








We can see that it is more difficult for condition (28) than for (29) to hold. By comparing (28) 
with (29), we see that the tendency for integration in the second period is weakened (less likely 
to be chosen) by the fact that the two firms are separated in the first period. Without the influ-
ence of the first period, the firms are more likely to integrate in the second period. This influence 
is represented by the extra multiplier 𝜇1𝑆 in (28), where the subscript 1𝑆 stands for “first-period 
separation” and 
𝜇1𝑆 = 1 +









We make several observations regarding this multiplier. First, when the market expands (𝐴2/𝐴1 
is larger), this multiplier is smaller, implying that second-period integration is less influenced by 
first-period separation. The explanation is that, when the market in the second period is larger 
than that in the first period, the choice of organizational structure in the second period depends 
less on the past. Second, a larger 𝜌 implies a larger 𝜇1𝑆, in turn implying a larger influence of the 
first period if adjustment cost rises. The explanation is that, since the two firms are separated in 
the first period, a larger adjustment cost boosts the influence of the first period since first-period 
separation hinders second-period integration through the adjustment cost. Third, since a rising 
𝛿 reduces 𝜇1𝑆, stronger preference for the future reduces the influence of the first period.  
Proposition 1. Given first-period separation, the two firms decide to integrate in the second 
period if and only if (28) holds, which implies that 
 The tendency for integration in the second period is stronger if the marginal output under 
integration is substantially larger than that under separation, if the chance of making deals 
in the market is lower, if the adjustment cost is smaller, if the market is expanding, or if the 
preference for the future is stronger.  
 The influence of the first period is stronger if the market is shrinking, if the adjustment cost 
is larger, or if the preference for the future is weaker.  
History matters, especially when current moves were planned in the past. Instead of looking 
at current conditions as most researchers do, Bergh (1997) looks at earlier conditions at the time 
when a division was acquired as we do. He finds that the likelihood of divestiture is dependent 
on motives, expectations and conditions at the time when a division was acquired. Consistent 
with our theory, Aron (1991) points out that the reacquisition of the spun-off division is efficient, 
that is, both the spin-off and the acquisition are optimal. Johnson (1996) studies the prevalent 
phenomenon during the 1980s when many U.S. firms divested their previous acquisitions. He 
finds that conditions such as changing business environment and firm governance are explana-
tions for this. 
Given First-Period Integration: Cases II vs. IS 
Given that the two firms are integrated in the first period, they consider staying integrated 
























where 𝜌 is assumed to be small enough so that 𝜌𝛿 ≤ 𝜃. We can draw five conclusions from (30). 
First, since (30) is more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is larger, given first-period integration, the ten-
dency for second-period integration is stronger if the UF’s marginal output under integration is 
substantially larger than that under separation. Second, since (30) is more likely to hold if 𝜃 is 
smaller, given first-period integration, the tendency for second-period integration is stronger if 
the chance of making deals in the market is lower. Third, since (30) is more likely to hold if 𝜌 is 
larger, the tendency for maintaining the existing status is stronger in the second period if the 
adjustment cost is larger. In this case, since the two firms are integrated in the first period, the 
tendency for integration in the second period is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger. Fourth, 
since (30) is more likely to hold if 𝐴2/𝐴1 is smaller, given first-period integration, the tendency 
for second-period integration is stronger if the market is contracting. With a contracting market, 
the adjustment cost does not justify a change of status. Fifth, since the right-hand side of (30) is 
decreasing in 𝛿, given first-period integration, the tendency for second-period integration is 
weaker if the preference for the future is stronger (the discount factor is larger). That is , when 
the future is view more importantly, the fact that the two firms are integrated in the first period 
has less influence on the second-period decision.  
In contrast, if the first period does not exist (or not in consideration), the payoffs are as de-
fined in (27). We find that 𝑉2𝐼 > 𝑉2𝑆 if and only if (29) holds. We can see that condition (30) 
holds more easily than (29). Without the influence of the first period, the two firms are less 
likely to integrate in the second period. By comparing (30) with (29), we see that the tendency 
for integration is strengthened (more likely to be chosen) by the fact that they are integrated in 
the first period. This factor is represented by the extra multiplier 𝜇1𝐼 in (30), where the subscript 
1𝐼 stands for “first-period integration” and 
𝜇1𝐼 = {1 +
1
𝛿













We make several observations regarding this multiplier. First, when the market expands (𝐴2/𝐴1 
is larger), this multiplier is larger, implying that second-period integration is less influenced by 
first-period integration.4 The explanation is that, when the market is expanding, it makes more 
sense to maintain the existing organizational structure in the second period. Second, a larger 𝜌 
implies a smaller 𝜇1𝐼, in turn implying a larger influence of the first period if the adjustment cost 
rises. The explanation is that, since the two firms are integrated in the first period, it makes 
more sense to remain integrated in the second period when the adjustment cost is larger. Third, 
since a rising 𝛿 raises 𝜇1𝐼, a higher preference for the future reduces the influence of the first 
                                                        
4 A larger 𝜇1𝐼 means less influence. When 𝜇1𝐼 is at its largest possible value, i.e., 𝜇1𝐼 = 1, the first 
period has no influence. 
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period. Fourth, since a larger 𝜃 raises 𝜇1𝐼, a better chance of making deals in the market reduces 
the influence of the first period. A larger 𝜃 encourages separation, which is against the first-
period decision.  
We make a further interesting observation by comparing 𝜇1𝑆  with 𝜇1𝐼 . Since 𝜇1𝑆 > 1 and 
𝜇1𝐼 < 1, we see that different first-period decisions have very different influences on second-
period decisions. The fact that 𝜇1𝑆 > 1 means that first-period separation has a negative effect 
on second-period integration comparing with that if the first period does not exist (or not in 
consideration), while the fact that 𝜇1𝐼 < 1 means that first-period integration has a positive 
effect on second-period integration comparing with that if the first period does not exist. That is, 
first-period separation hinders second-period integration, while first-period integration encour-
ages second-period integration. The differential effect 𝜇1𝑆 − 𝜇1𝐼 of the first period is not trivially 
dependent on the adjustment cost. The adjustment cost obviously plays a role, but so do other 
factors. For example, if the market contracts, i.e., 𝐴2/𝐴1  decreases, the difference 𝜇1𝑆 − 𝜇1𝐼 
increases, implying a larger differential effect of the first period. On the other hand, if the mar-
ket expands quickly, when 𝐴2 𝐴1⁄ → ∞, we have 𝜇1𝑆 = 𝜇1𝐼, meaning that the influence of the 
first-period becomes marginal if the market expands quickly. Also, a larger 𝛿 implies a smaller 
𝜇1𝑆 but a larger 𝜇1𝐼, meaning that an increase in the preference for the future reduces the differ-
ential effect of the first period. This is intuitive. As the firms have a stronger preference for the 
future, the influence of the first period would be reduced. Further, a larger 𝜃 has no effect on 𝜇1𝑆 
but implies a larger 𝜇1𝐼, meaning that a better chance of making deals in the market reduces the 
differential effect of the first period. Also, a larger 𝜌 implies a larger 𝜇1𝑆 but a smaller 𝜇1𝐼, mean-
ing that an increase in the adjustment cost enlarges the differential effect of the first period.   
Proposition 2. Given first-period integration, the two firms decide to integrate in the second 
period if and only if (30) holds, which implies that 
 The tendency for second-period integration is stronger if the marginal output under integra-
tion is substantially larger than that under separation, if the chance of making deals in the 
market is lower if the adjustment cost is larger, if the market is contracting, or if the prefer-
ence for the future is weaker.  
 The influence of the first period is stronger if the market is contracting, if the adjustment cost 
is larger, if the preference for the future is weaker, or if the chance of making deals in the 
market is lower.  
 The differential effect of differences in first-period decisions on second-period decisions is 
stronger if the market is contracting, if there is less preference for the future, if the chance of 
making deals in the market is lower, or if the adjustment cost is larger. ∎ 
22 
Prior literature supports our findings. Porter (1987) finds that companies divest more than 
half of their acquisitions and “the track record in unrelated acquisitions is even worse – the 
average divestment rate is a startling 74%.” Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that 44% of the 
large acquisitions between 1971 and 1982 were divested by 1989. Weston (1989) points out that 
some divestitures may have been planned at the time of acquisition as a way to harvest invest-
ments. He further finds that the dependence of divestitures on past acquisitions is influenced by 
the external environment, which supports our theory. Montgomery et al. (1984) find that divest-
itures made as part of integrated strategic plans are positively valued by the market, while non-
strategic divestitures are negatively valued. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) argue that divestitures 
are likely to be planned at the time of acquisition. They observe that assets were spun off after a 
period of generally positive abnormal returns, implying the possibility of planned spin-offs. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) further find that acquired divisions are more likely to be sold off 
than original divisions. These studies support our theory that a divestiture is already anticipated 
at the time of acquisition. 
4.2. Influence of Future Decisions 
Given the plan in the second period, we now analyze the decisions in the first period. In the 
first period, the two firms consider integrating or separating conditional on a plan in the second 
period. That is, the firms’ organizational decisions in the first period are forward looking. We 
consider two pairs of comparison: 
𝑉𝐼𝑆  vs.  𝑉𝑆𝑆,    𝑉𝐼𝐼  vs.  𝑉𝑆𝐼 . 
In the first pair, the second-period status is separation; in the second pair, the second-period 
status is integration. 
Conditional on Second-Period Separation: Cases IS vs. SS 
Given that the two firms are to be separated in the second period, they consider whether or 













We can draw four conclusions from (31). First, since (31) is more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is larger, 
in expectation of second-period separation, the tendency for first-period integration is stronger 
if the UF’s marginal output under integration is substantially larger than that under separation. 
Second, since (31) is more likely to hold if 𝜌 is smaller, the tendency for a change of status in the 
first period is stronger if the adjustment cost is smaller. In this case, since the two firms plan to 
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be separate firms in the second period, the tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the 
adjustment cost is smaller. Third, since (31) is interestingly not affected by 𝐴2/𝐴1, the tendency 
for first-period integration is not affected by market fluctuations. The explanation is that, since 
the second-period decision has taken into account market fluctuations, the first-period decision 
needs not do the same. Fourth, since (31) is more likely to hold if 𝛿 is smaller, the tendency for 
first-period integration is stronger if the preference for the future is weaker. The explanation is 
that, with a weaker preference for the future, second-period separation has less influence on 
first-period integration.  
In contrast, if there is no second period to speak of (or not in consideration), the payoffs are 








We can see that it is more difficult for condition (31) than for (32) to hold. By comparing (31) 
with (32), we see that the tendency for first-period integration is weakened (less likely to be 
chosen) by the fact that the firms are to be separated in the second period. Without the influence 
of the second period, the firms are more likely to integrate in the first period. This influence is 
represented by the extra multiplier 𝜇2𝑆 in (31), where the subscript 2𝑆 stands for “second-period 
separation” and 






We make several observations regarding this multiplier. First, this multiplier is not affected by 
changes in 𝐴2/𝐴1, implying that the influence of second-period separation on first-period inte-
gration is not affected by market fluctuations. The explanation is that, since the second-period 
decision has already taken into account market fluctuations, the first-period decision need not 
do the same. Second, a larger 𝜌 implies a larger 𝜇2𝑆, in turn implying a larger influence of the 
second period if adjustment cost rises. The explanation is that, since the two firms are to be 
separated in the second period, a larger adjustment cost hinders a change of status and boosts 
the influence of the second period. Third, since a rising 𝛿 raises 𝜇2𝑆, a stronger preference for the 
future increases the influence of the future. Fourth, since a larger 𝜃 reduces 𝜇2𝑆, a better chance 
of making deals in the market reduces the influence of the second period. The explanation is 
that, since separation is less costly with a larger 𝜃, second-best separation is more likely and 
hence has less influence on first-period decisions.  
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Proposition 3. In expectation of second-period separation, the two firms decide to integrate 
in the first period if and only if (31) holds, which implies that 
 The tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the marginal output under integra-
tion is substantially larger than that under separation, if the adjustment cost is smaller, or if 
the preference for the future is weaker. Market fluctuations have no effect on this tendency. 
 The influence of the second period is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger, if the prefer-
ence for the future is stronger, or if the chance of making deals in the market is lower. This 
influence is not affected by market fluctuations.  
Hitt et al. (2009) mention that “While there has been a significant amount of research on 
mergers and acquisitions, there appears to be little consensus as to the reasons for outcomes 
achieved from them”. One major puzzle is that M&As often have a negative effect on the current 
stock value yet the market typically reacts positively to divestitures (Allen et al. 1995; Betton and 
Morán 2003; Morán 2003). Our theory offers an explanation to this puzzle. If an acquiring firm 
has a long-term plan, an M&A today may be conducted in anticipation of some future action. If 
that is the case, then the M&A may have a negative effect on today’s stock value, but it would 
have a positive effect on the future divestiture. If the market is not aware of the firm’s plan or 
suspects other reasons for the M&A, especially if the acquired division does not seem to fit the 
firm, the market would react negatively when the acquired division is losing money and react 
positively when the division is divested. Tehranian et al. (1987) find that the market’s response 
to sell-offs is based on managers’ decision horizons. The market responds more favorably to sell-
offs made by firms with long-term performance plans than to those made by firms with short-
term performance plans. Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006) explain “why mergers may be valuable 
ex ante while leading to successful divestitures ex post.” Mata and Portugal (2000) further find 
that firms that entered an industry through acquisitions are more likely to divest. These lines of 
theory and empirical evidence support our emphasis on the effect of future plans on current 
decisions.  
Conditional on Second-Period Integration: Cases II vs. SI 
Given that the two firms are to be integrated in the second period, they consider whether or 







(1 − 𝜌𝛿)2. (33) 
We can draw five conclusions from (33). First, since (33) is more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is larger, 
the tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the UF’s marginal output under integra-
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tion is substantially larger than that under separation. Second, since (33) is more likely to hold if 
𝜃 is smaller, in expectation of second-period integration, the tendency for first-period integra-
tion is stronger if the chance of making deals in the market is lower. Third, since (33) is more 
likely to hold if 𝜌 is larger, the tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the adjustment 
cost is larger. In this case, since the two firms plan to be integrated in the second period, the 
tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger. Fourth, since 
(33) is interestingly not affected by 𝐴2/𝐴1, the tendency for first-period integration is not affect-
ed by market fluctuations. Since the second-period decision has already taken into account 
market fluctuations, the first-period decisions need not do the same. Fifth, since (33) is more 
likely to hold if 𝛿 is larger, the tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the preference 
for the future is stronger. Given second-period integration and a stronger preference for the 
second period, first-period integration makes sense. 
In contrast, if there is no second period to speak of (or not in consideration), the payoffs are 
as defined by 𝑉1𝐼 and 𝑉1𝑆 in (27). We find that 𝑉1𝐼 > 𝑉1𝑆 if and only if (32) holds. We can see that 
condition (33) holds more easily than (32). By comparing (33) with (32), we see that the tenden-
cy for first-period integration is stronger (more likely to be chosen) by the fact that the firms are 
to be integrated in the second period. Without the influence of the second period, the firms are 
less likely to integrate in the first period. This influence is represented by the extra multiplier 𝜇2𝐼 
in (33), where the subscript 2𝐼 stands for “second-period integration” and 
𝜇2𝐼 = (1 − 𝜌𝛿)
2. 
We make several observations regarding this multiplier. First, this multiplier is not affected by 
changes in 𝐴2/𝐴1, implying that the influence of second-period integration on first-period inte-
gration is not affected by market fluctuations. The explanation is that, since the second-period 
decision has already taken into account market fluctuations, the first-period decision need not 
do the same. Second, a larger 𝜌 implies a smaller 𝜇2𝐼, in turn implying a larger influence of the 
second period if the adjustment cost rises. The explanation is that, since the two firms are to be 
integrated in the second period, a larger adjustment cost hinders a change of status and hence 
boosts the influence of the second period.5 Third, since a rising 𝛿 reduces 𝜇2𝐼, a stronger prefer-
ence for the future boosts the influence of the future.  
We make a further interesting observation by comparing 𝜇2𝑆 with 𝜇2𝐼 . Since 𝜇2𝑆 > 1 and 
𝜇2𝐼 < 1, different second-period decisions have very different influences on first-period deci-
sions. The fact that 𝜇2𝑆 > 1 means that second-period separation has a negative effect on first-
                                                        
5 The influence is larger if 𝜇2𝐼  is smaller. When 𝜇2𝐼 is at its largest possible value (𝜇2𝐼 = 1), the 
second period has no influence. 
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period integration, while the fact that 𝜇2𝐼 < 1 means that second-period integration has a posi-
tive effect on first-period integration. That is, second-period separation hinders first-period 
integration, while second-period integration encourages first-period integration. We find that a 
larger 𝛿 implies a larger 𝜇2𝑆 but a smaller 𝜇2𝐼, meaning that an increase in the preference for the 
future raises the differential effect 𝜇2𝑆 − 𝜇2𝐼 of different second-period decisions. This is intui-
tive. As the firms focus more on the future, the influence of the second period would be greater. 
Also, a larger 𝜌 implies a larger 𝜇2𝑆 but a smaller 𝜇2𝐼, meaning that an increase in the adjustment 
cost enlarges the differences in influence from different second-period decisions. Further, a 
larger 𝜃 reduces 𝜇2𝑆 but has no effect on 𝜇2𝐼, meaning that a better chance of making deals in the 
market reduces the differential effect of different second-period decisions.  
Proposition 4. In expectation of second-period integration, the two firms decide to integrate 
in the first period if and only if (33) holds, which implies that 
 The tendency for first-period integration is stronger if the marginal output under integra-
tion is substantially larger than that under separation, if the adjustment cost is larger, if the 
chance of making deals in the market is lower, or if the preference for the future is stronger. 
But market fluctuations do not affect this tendency. 
 The influence of the second period is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger, or if the pref-
erence for the future is stronger. But this influence is not affected by market fluctuations.  
 The differential effect of differences in second-period decisions on first-period decisions is 
stronger if there is a stronger preference for the future, if the adjustment cost is larger, or if 
the chance of making deals in the market is lower.  
Van Beers and Sadowski (2003) find a stable and positive correlation between acquisitions 
and divestitures in the manufacturing and service industries. This suggests that a divestiture 
today is likely to be conducted in anticipation of an acquisition in the future and vice versa, 
which is in support of our conclusion.   
4.3. Past vs. Future Influences 
In the above two sections, we looked at the influences of the past and future separately. In 
this section, we allow the firms to consider both influences together. 
Suppose the two firms are considering integration or separation today. This decision may be 
influenced by the past. If the two firms were integrated in the past, a condition for integration 
today is 𝑉𝐼𝐼 > 𝑉𝐼𝑆 or (30). If the two firms plan to be integrated in the future, a condition for 
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integration today is 𝑉𝐼𝐼 > 𝑉𝑆𝐼 or (33). Hence, if the (past, future) status is (integration, integra-
tion), the conditions for integration today are (30) and (33). Similarly, we can analyze the other 
three (past, future) statuses and show that conditions (28) and (31) ensure that whatever the 
(past, future) status is, the two firms will choose integration today. We find that conditions (28) 
and (31) are more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is larger, 𝐴2/𝐴1 is larger, or 𝜌 is smaller. Also, (28) is 
more likely to hold if 𝛿 is larger, but (31) is more likely to hold if 𝛿 is smaller. If 𝛿 is large, the 
time preference is in favor of today over the past; if 𝛿 is small, the time preference is again in 
favor of today over the future. Hence, when the time preference is in favor of today, integration 
is likely to happen today. 
Similarly, we find that, if conditions (30) and (33) fail, the two firms will decide to separate 
today irrespective of the past and future. The results are summarized in the following proposi-
tion.  
Proposition 5. Irrespective of the two firms’ statuses in the past and future, 
 If conditions (28) and (31) hold, they will choose integration today, and the tendency for 
integration today is stronger if the marginal output under integration is substantially larger 
than that under separation, if the market is expanding, if the adjustment cost is smaller, or if 
the time preference is in favor of today.  
 If conditions (30) and (33) fail, they will choose separation today, and the tendency for 
separation today is stronger if the marginal output under integration is substantially less 
than that under separation, if the market is expanding, if the adjustment cost is smaller, if 
the chance of making deals in the market is higher, or if the time preference is in favor of to-
day. 
Weston (1989) points out that divestiture is a way to harvest investments through M&As, 
and is often stimulated by favorable market conditions, which is consistent with our theory. 
4.4. Short-Term Integration 
If the two firms want to be integrated for a short time only (say one period), should they in-
tegrate early or late? Cases SI and IS are about short-term integration, where the former in-
volves late integration and the latter early integration. 



































We can draw three conclusions from (34). First, since (34) is more likely to hold if 𝐵𝐼/𝐵𝑆 is 
smaller, the tendency for early integration is stronger if the UF’s marginal output under integra-
tion is substantially less than that under separation. The explanation is that, with the require-
ment of 𝛿 being large enough by (35), it is better to capture the benefit of integration early if the 
preference for the future is strong. Second, since (34) is more likely to hold if 𝜃 is larger, the 
tendency for early integration is stronger if it is more likely to make deals in the market. Again, 
with the requirement of 𝛿 being large enough by (35), it is better to capture the benefit of inte-
gration early if the preference for the future is strong. Third, since (34) is more likely to hold if 
𝐴2/𝐴1 is larger, the tendency for early integration is stronger if the market is expanding. The 
explanation is that, since incentives are better under separation, it is better to postpone separa-
tion until the market condition improves.  
Proposition 6. For short-term integration, if (35) holds (fails), condition (34) ensures that 
early (late) integration is better, which implies that  
 The tendency for early (late) integration over late (early) integration is stronger if the mar-
ginal output under integration is substantially less than that under separation, if the chance 
of making deals in the market is higher, or if the market is expanding sufficiently quickly.  
Our theory indicates that firms tend to acquire a division right away instead of waiting 
when macro conditions at the market level are favorable, such as when the market is expanding 
quickly or M&A activity is vigorous. Our theory also suggests that micro conditions at the firm 
level, such as differentials in marginal productivity, may play a role.  
There is a large literature on the timing of M&As (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Bruner 2004; 
Harford 2005; Müller-Stewens 2010; DePamphilis 2011; Meckl 2012; Eisenbarth and Meckl 
2014). Interestingly, M&A activity typically occurs in waves, with six waves in the last 118 years 
(Müller-Stewens 2010; Meckl 2012), suggesting the importance of market conditions. Eisen-
barth and Meckl (2014) find that M&A activity is procyclical and each M&A wave in the past was 
“accompanied by sinking interest rates, increasing stock market and increasing economic 
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growth”. This empirical evidence is consistent with our conclusion that the tendency to integrate 
early is stronger if the chance of making deals in the market is higher or if the market is expand-
ing quickly. The chance of making deals in the market can be measured by the intensity of stock 
market activity. Indeed, Eisenbarth and Meckl (2014) find a significantly positive correlation 
between stock prices and M&A activity. 
4.5. Contractual Analysis 
From the analysis in Section 3, there is an optimal linear contract of the form 𝑠𝑖(𝑥) = 𝛼𝑖𝑥 +
𝛽𝑖 or 𝑠𝑖(𝜋) = 𝛼𝑖𝜋 + 𝛽𝑖 in each of the four cases. From conditions (3), (6), (9), (12), (15), (18), (21) 
and (24), we know that the constant 𝛼𝑖 is designed to satisfy the IC condition, and the constant 
𝛽𝑖 is designed to satisfy the IR condition. 𝛽𝑖 represents a one-time transfer between the two 
parties, which does not affect incentives, while 𝛼𝑖 represents how the two parties share ex-post 
output or profit, which offers incentives. Hence, our interest is in the income sharing rule 𝛼𝑖. 

























































We make several observations regarding the income sharing rule 𝛼𝑖
∗. First, the contractual 
terms are dependent on the organizational structure. In different organizational arrangements, 
contractual terms differ. Second, when the two firms are separate, the income sharing rule is 
dependent on market conditions, and the dependence is interestingly characterized by a com-
mon factor 𝐴𝑖 (√𝜃
4
√𝐵𝑆)⁄  . Only when a change of status in the future is expected, an extra term 
𝜌𝛿 is used to take into account the adjustment cost. Third, when the two firms are integrated, if 
a change of status in the future is not expected, the income sharing rule is 𝛼𝑖
∗ = 1/2, i.e., they 
share profit equally. However, as shown in case IS, the income sharing rule under integration in 
the first period uses an extra term 𝜌𝛿/𝜃 when a change of status is expected, where the extra 
term takes into account the adjustment cost and the chance of making deals in the market when 
the UF becomes separated in the second period. Fourth, in expectation of a change of status in 
the second period, the UF’s first-period income share is reduced comparing to that if there is no 
future organizational change. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
A company has two levels of strategy: division strategy and corporate strategy. Division 
strategy focuses on competitive advantage in each division. Corporate strategy concerns what 
businesses the company should be in and how divisions should be organized. The fact that cor-
porate raiders can succeed in profit making is evidence for the important of corporate strategy 
(Porter 1987). We focus on corporate strategy.  
An M&A may be due to an earlier divestiture or a planned future one. Similarly, a divesti-
ture may occur following an earlier M&A or a planned future one. When a firm considers acquir-
ing another, the option to divest the acquiree in the future is an important consideration; on the 
other hand, the fact that the acquirer had once divested this acquiree (but is trying to reacquire 
it now) is also an important factor. Given these considerations, this paper focuses on forward- 
and backward-looking M&As and divestitures.  
Prior literature has never discussed the influence of past and future decisions on current 
decisions. As we have shown, forward- and backward-looking behaviors have major influences 
on current decisions. We have built a dynamic vertical integration model, which has never been 
seen in prior literature. In such a model, asset specificity and adjustment cost play important 
roles in mergers and divestitures. 
Our main findings are: Forward- and backward-looking organizational decisions are sub-
stantially different from static ones. The influence of the first period is stronger if the market is 
contracting, if the adjustment cost is larger, or if the preference for the future is weaker. On the 
other hand, the influence of the second period is stronger if the adjustment cost is larger, if the 
preference for the future is stronger, or if the chance of making deals in the market is lower. 
Further, in the case where two firms choose to be integrated for a short time, the tendency for 
early (late) integration over late (early) integration is stronger if the marginal output under 
integration is substantially less than that under separation, if the chance of making deals in the 
market is higher, or if the market is expanding sufficiently quickly.  
Our paper offers a unified theory covering four cases. These four cases encompass three 
patterns of mergers and divestitures that are often observed in practice. The first case is repeat-
ed integration and separation: two firms choose to integrate but later decide to separate (case 
IS); after a while, they decide to integrate again (case SI). The second case is permanent separa-
tion: two firms decide to separate (case IS) and to remain separated forever (case SS). The third 
case is permanent integration: two firms decide to integrate (case SI) and to remain integrated 
forever (case II). Prior studies have discussed either case IS or case SI, but they were always 
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treated as two unrelated cases. We extend prior studies by analyzing these two cases  in the same 
model.  
Appendix 
A1. The General Solution 
This section offers proofs of the solutions for the four cases in Section 3.  
The Solution for Case SI 
For both problems (1) and (4), if the IR condition is not binding, the DF can always offer 
𝑠𝑡(⋅) −  for some > 0 instead of 𝑠𝑡(⋅) to satisfy the IR condition. Hence, the IR condition must 
be binding in equilibrium.  
In the second period, by the binding IR condition, problem (1) becomes 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]
                             s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)
                                     𝐼𝐶2: (1 − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]})𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                                     𝐼𝑅:   𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 
Utilizing 𝐼𝐶1 for 𝐼𝐶2, this problem can be transformed into 
 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]
                             s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)






′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                                     𝐼𝑅:    𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 (A1) 
Since 𝑠2(𝜋) does not appear in the objective function of problem (A1), it can be solved using (2) 
and (3).  
In the first period, since the UF has no surplus in the second period (a binding IR condi-
tion), we have 𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏) = 0. For problem (4), with a binding IR condition, problem (4) becomes 
𝑉𝑆𝐼 = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠1( ⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
                 s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                          𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + 𝛿𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                          𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠1(𝑥) does not appear in the objective function, it can be solved using (5) and (6).  
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The Solution for Case IS 
In the second period, it is easy to see that the IR condition in (7) must be binding. Hence, 
problem (7) can be rewritten as 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝜃
−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝜃
−1𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]
                             s.t.   𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)
                                     𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                                     𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
 
Since 𝑠2(𝑥) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using (8) and 
(9).  
In the first period, it is also easy to see that the IR condition in (10) must be binding. Hence, 
problem (10) can be rewritten as 
𝑉𝐼𝑆 = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠1( ⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)
                s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                         𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏






′ (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                         𝐼𝑅:    𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠1(𝜋) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using (11) and 
(12).  
The Solution for Case II 
In the second period, it is easy to see that the IR condition in (13) must be binding. Hence, 
problem (13) can be rewritten as  
𝑉2 = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
              s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎)
                       𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏](1 − 𝑠2
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}) = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏)
                       𝐼𝑅:    𝑠2{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠2(𝜋) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using (14) and 
(15).  
In the first period, it is also easy to see that the IR condition in (16) must be binding. Hence, 




 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝑉2
                s.t.      𝐼𝐶1:  𝑠1
′ {𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝜋𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                           𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏







                           𝐼𝑅:    𝑠1{𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]} = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠1(𝜋) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using (17) and 
(18).  
The Solution for Case SS 
In the second period, it is easy to see that the IR condition in (19) must be binding. Hence, 
problem (19) can be rewritten as 
𝑉2 = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
              s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠2
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                        𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                        𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠2[𝑥(𝑎)] = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠2(𝑥) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using(20) and 
(21).  
In the first period, it is also easy to see that the IR condition in (22) must be binding. Hence, 
problem (22) can be rewritten as 
𝑉𝑆𝑆 = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠1( ⋅)
𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝑉2
               s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  𝜃𝑠1
′ [𝑥(𝑎)]𝑥′(𝑎) = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                         𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                         𝐼𝑅:    𝜃𝑠1[𝑥(𝑎)] = 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
 
Since 𝑠1(𝑥) does not appear in the objective function, this problem can be solved using (23) and 
(24).  
A2. Justification for the Parametric Functions  
This section provides a justification for the parametric functions in (25).  
Suppose there are two types of variables: verifiable and unverifiable variables. Verifiable 
variables, such as labor input 𝑙 and capital input 𝑘, can be dealt with through the market, while 
unverifiable variables, such as the UF’s effort 𝑎 and the DF’s effort 𝑏, can be dealt with through 
contracts. The DF’s pre-contractual profit is denoted by 𝜋(𝑥, 𝑏), which includes part of the pro-
duction costs, but not the cost of immediate input 𝑥 and effort 𝑏. In the Arrow-Debreu world, 
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organizational structure (and capital structure, etc.) is irrelevant. Hence, no matter whether the 
two firms are separated or integrated, we can always treat them as independent firms when 
referring to verifiable inputs and these inputs will be determined by market equilibrium.  
For example, suppose that labor and capital inputs 𝑙 and 𝑘 are verifiable. Then, in perfectly 
competitive markets, given inputs 𝑥 and 𝑏, consider the DF’s problem: 
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑏) ≡ max
𝑙,𝑘
 𝑝𝑙𝛼𝑘𝛽𝑓(𝑥, 𝑏)1−𝛼−𝛽 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑟𝑘, 
where prices 𝑝, 𝑤  and 𝑟 are assumed to be constant, 𝛼  and 𝛽  are positive constants, and an 
arbitrary function 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑏) covers contributions from inputs 𝑥  and 𝑏. We may call 𝛼  and 𝛽 the 
contribution shares of labor and capital, respectively. They are the contribution shares of the 
verifiable variables. And, 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 is the contribution share of the unverifiable variables. Then, 
the optimal profit is 















Hence, for given 𝑥 and 𝑏, we can generally let the DF’s profit function in period 𝑡 be 
 𝜋𝑡(𝑥, 𝑏) = 𝐴𝑡𝑓(𝑥, 𝑏), (A2) 
where 𝐴𝑡 > 0 is dependent on market conditions in period 𝑡.    
We can similarly consider the UF’s problem. Again, since a firm’s organizational structure is 
irrelevant in competitive markets, no matter whether the UF is separated or integrated, we can 
always treat it as an independent firm when referring to verifiable inputs. Hence, in perfectly 
competitive markets, given input 𝑎, the UF’s problem for verifiable inputs is 
𝜋(𝑎) ≡ max
𝑙,𝑘
 𝑝𝑙𝛼𝑘𝛽𝑔(𝑎)1−𝛼−𝛽 − 𝑤𝑙 − 𝑟𝑘, 
where prices 𝑝, 𝑤, and 𝑟 and parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 may not be the same as those in the DF’s prob-
lem above. We use the same notation for convenience. Let 𝑙∗ and 𝑘∗ be the optimal inputs. Then, 
the optimal output is 
















and the optimal profit is 














𝑔(𝑎) = (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑝𝑥(𝑎). 
Hence, we can generally let the UF’s production function under status 𝑠 be  
 𝑥𝑠(𝑎) = 𝐵𝑠𝑔(𝑎), (A3) 
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for some constant 𝐵𝑠 > 0, where 𝐵𝑠 is dependent on market conditions under status 𝑠.  
A3. The Model under Uncertainty 
This part shows that an extension to allow random profit and output will not change our re-
sults at all. 
We now assume that both ?̃? and ?̃? in each period are random variables. Let ℎ(𝑎) and ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏) 
be two arbitrary functions. Given 𝑥, ?̃? follows the conditional density function 𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)], i.e., 
?̃? ~ 𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)]. 
Output ?̃? follows the conditional density function 𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)], i.e., 
?̃? ~ 𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]. 
The explanation is that uncertainty comes from the markets. When a division is an independent 
firm and faces the markets, its output is uncertainty. Only when it is inside a firm as a division, 
its output is deterministic. Denote the expected profit by 
Π(𝑥, 𝑏) ≡ 𝐸(?̃?|𝑥) = ∫ 𝜋𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)]𝑑𝜋, 
and the expected output is 
𝑋(𝑎) ≡ 𝐸(?̃?) = ∫ 𝑥𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥, 
and 
Π(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡ 𝐸(?̃?) = ∬ 𝜋𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)]𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝜋𝑑𝑥. 
Here, there is some abuse of notation. ℎ(𝑎) and ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏) are actually unrelated functions, and 
𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)] and  𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)] are also unrelated functions.  
Output 𝑥 is deterministic when the division is inside a firm; output is random when the di-
vision is an independent firm. Actually, output can be random even when the division is inside 
the firm; all results remain exactly the same.  
Case SI 
In the second period, the UF is under a contract 𝑠2(𝜋). This contract is based on the inte-
grated firm’s profit 𝜋 since the two firms are integrated at that time. The UF’s problem is 
𝑈2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) ≡ max
𝑎
 ∫ 𝑠2(𝜋)𝑓{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1], 
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where 𝑥(𝑎1) is output in the first period, which is not random in the second period since the 
division is inside the firm. The DF’s ex post problem in the second period is 
max
𝑏
∫[𝜋 − 𝑠2(𝜋)]𝑓{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏). 
Then, the DF’s ex ante problem is 
 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = max
𝑎,𝑏,𝑠2(⋅)
∫[𝜋 − 𝑠2(𝜋)]𝑓{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏)
                             s.t.    𝐼𝐶1:  ℎ𝑥
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]𝑥′(𝑎) ∫ 𝑠2(𝜋)𝑓ℎ
′{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                                      𝐼𝐶2:  ℎ𝑏
′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] ∫[𝜋 − 𝑠2(𝜋)]𝑓ℎ
′{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                                      𝐼𝑅:  ∫ 𝑠2(𝜋)𝑓{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1].
  
In the first period, the two firms are separated. The DF offers a contract 𝑠1(𝑥) to the UF in 
the first period. This contract is based on the UF’s output 𝑥. This 𝑥 is random since the division 
is an independent firm. Given this contract, the UF’s first period problem is 
𝑈1 = max
𝑎
 𝜃 ∫ 𝑠1(𝑥)𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) + 𝛿𝜃𝐸[𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏)]. 
𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏) is random in the first period since the second-period output is random in the first peri-
od. The DF’s ex post problem is 
max
𝑏
∬ 𝜋𝑓[𝜋|ℎ(𝑥, 𝑏)]𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝜋𝑑𝑥  − ∫ 𝑠1(𝑥) 𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝐸[𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)], 
𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏) is random in the first period since the second-period output is random in the first peri-




 𝛱(𝑎, 𝑏) − ∫ 𝑠1(𝑥) 𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝐸[𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)]
                s.t.     𝐼𝐶1:  ℎ
′(𝑎)𝜃 ∫ 𝑠1(𝑥)𝑓ℎ
′[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥 + 𝛿𝜃𝐸[𝑈2,𝑎
′ (𝑎, 𝑏)] = 𝑐𝑈
′ (𝑎),
                          𝐼𝐶2:  𝛱𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝛿𝐸[𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏)] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏),
                          𝐼𝑅:   𝜃 ∫ 𝑠1(𝑥)𝑓[𝑥|ℎ(𝑎)]𝑑𝑥 + 𝛿𝜃𝐸[𝑈2(𝑎, 𝑏)] ≥ 𝑐𝑈(𝑎).
  
By the same derivation process as that in Section A1, we have the following solution. 
Proposition 7. For case SI, investments (𝑎2
∗ , 𝑏2
∗) are from 
 
𝑉2(𝑎1, 𝑏1) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑎,𝑏
 𝛱[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] − 𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) − 𝑐𝐴[𝑥(𝑎1), 𝑏1]



















 𝛱(𝑎, 𝑏) − 𝜃−1𝑐𝑈(𝑎) − 𝑐𝐷(𝑏) + 𝛿𝐸[𝑉2(𝑎, 𝑏)]
             s.t.   𝛱𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏) + 𝛿𝐸[𝑉2,𝑏
′ (𝑎, 𝑏)] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏).
 (A5) 



































′ [𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] = 𝑐𝐷
′ (𝑏). 
If ?̃? = ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] + ̃, then 𝐸(?̃?) = ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏], implying ∫ 𝜋𝑓ℎ
′{𝜋|ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏]}𝑑𝜋 = 1. Hence, if we 
replace 𝜋[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏] by ℎ[𝑥(𝑎), 𝑏], problem (2) is the same as problem (A4). Hence, the extension 
to random profit and output will not change the conclusions. 
We have derived the solution for Case SI. Other cases are similar.  
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